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Over the last decade, the Brazilian banking industry has undergone major 
and deep transformations with several privatizations of state-owned banks, 
mergers and acquisitions, closing down of troubled banks, entry by foreign 
banks, etc. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impacts of these 
changes in banking total factor productivity. We first obtain measures of 
bank level productivity by employing the techniques due to Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003). We then relate such measures to a set of bank characteristics. 
Our main results indicate that state-owned banks are less productive than 
their private peers, and that privatization has increased productivity. 
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1. Introduction 
  The banking system in Brazil is the largest and the most complex one in Latin 
America. Like in many parts of the world, the banking industry in Brazil is undergoing 
a process of rapid and radical transformations. The common features of this process, in 
Brazil and elsewhere, include: an increase in competition from within the industry as 
well as from the outside; a wave of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities, including 
several cross-border deals; more globalized capital markets with highly volatile capital 
flows, which are capable of causing havoc in some national financial sectors; new 
financial products, with increasing reliance on off-balance sheet activities; new banking 
practices brought out by the information technology revolution. 
  The banking sector in Brazil has been strongly influenced by the changing 
domestic macroeconomic scene of the recent period, especially by the transition from a 
high to a low inflation environment. After many years of making a living out of 
inflationary rents, this transition was far from smooth for many banks. 
Amongst those most affected by the many changes in the industry were the state-
owned banks. Due to their poor performance, many of the state-owned banks in Brazil 
were either closed down or privatized. Less than half (14) of the 32 state-owned banks 
operating in the country by 1994 were still active by 2002. 
The Brazilian experience represents an interesting case study on bank 
privatization not only because of its quantitative relevance but also due to the varied 
options given to the state-owned banks following their restructuring. Thus, some state-
owned banks were straight privatized by their controllers (namely, the Brazilian states) 
whereas some others had their control first transferred from the states to the federal 
government and then privatized. Some other states also kept the control of their banks 
after restructuring. There are also some other state-owned banks that were just 
liquidated. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the privatization of state-
owned banks on productivity. Measures of bank-level total factor productivity are first 
obtained as the residuals from a production function estimate. The production function 
is estimated following the methodology suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to   5
try to control for endogeneity problems arising from the simultaneous choice of inputs 
and productivity by the bank firm.  
In a second stage, bank total factor productivity is related to a set of control 
variables. In an environment where many different types of corporate control changes 
are occurring simultaneously, it is important to try to control for as many of them as 
possible even though the primary interest of the paper lies on the effects of bank 
privatization. This is certainly the case for Brazil whereby privatization of state-owned 
banks were taking place alongside other corporate changes in the industry like domestic 
mergers and acquisitions, foreign acquisition of domestic banks, liquidation of banks, 
and pure exit from the market. We therefore follow the methodology proposed by 
Berger et al. (2003) and include variables controlling for static, selection, and dynamic 
effects. Static variables are dummies for groups of banks that have not had any 
corporate change over the sample period. Selection variables are dummies for groups of 
banks that have had some corporate change over the sample period. Such dummy 
variables are equal to one over the whole sample period for the corresponding banks. 
Dynamic variables are of two forms. A first set of dynamic variables are dummies for 
those banks that have had some corporate change over the sample period taking the 
value one only for the time periods following the change. A second set of dynamic 
variables track the number of time periods following the change. In addition to the 
static, selection, and dynamic variables we also included a set of dummy variables for 
those banks that have exited the market. Exit can occur either because the bank has been 
liquidated or because the bank has changed the nature of its activities. 
Our main results show that state-owned banks are less productive than private-
owned ones. Another main result of the paper is that privatization has had a positive 
impact on productivity. Moreover, the positive effects of privatization seem to take 
some time to materialize. Privatization proved also to be a superior strategy than 
restructuring and keeping the bank under state control. On the other hand, we could not 
find any strong performance differences related to the way a state-owned bank was 
privatized (i.e., straight privatization or federalization followed by privatization). We 
find no strong differences in the performances of the state-owned banks sold to foreign 
ones vis a vis state-owned banks sold to domestic ones either.   6
This paper contributes to the literature on bank productivity. The study of bank 
productivity is relevant because productivity is a summary performance measure. Thus, 
productivity analysis may be relevant to those involved in bank M&A issues, like bank 
practitioners or bank competition authorities. Also, to the extent that low productivity 
can work as an early warning, bank supervision authorities may use productivity 
measures as an additional monitoring instrument. Bank productivity studies are also 
useful due to the well-documented evidence that a bank system that efficiently channels 
available resources to productive uses is a powerful mechanism for economic growth 
[Levine (1997)]. 
This paper is also related to the literature on bank privatization. The empirical 
literature in this area takes the form of either cross-country studies or analyses of 
individual countries.
1 This literature provides broad support to the conclusions reached 
in this paper on the poorer performance of state-owned banks and on the beneficial 
impacts of bank privatization. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the 
banking industry in Brazil, with a special emphasis on the state-owned sector. Section 3 
describes the methodology to be applied in the empirical sections. Section 4 discusses 
data-related issues. Section 5 estimates the coefficients of a production function, from 
which the bank-level productivity measures are calculated. Section 6 studies the 
determinants of bank productivity, highlighting the role played by bank privatization. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Overview of the banking sector in Brazil 
The launching of the stabilization plan, called the Real Plan, in July 1994 with 
the subsequent transition to an environment of more stable prices proved to be very 
costly to the Brazilian banks. During the high-inflation period, banks could profit from 
inflation transfers. Inflation imposes a tax over the holders of money and non-interest 
                                                 
1 Boehmer et al. (2003), Bonin et al. (2003), Otchere (2003), and Nguyen and Williams (2003) are 
examples of cross-country studies. Some studies focusing on individual countries are, among others, 
Berger et al. (2003) for Argentina, Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill (2003) for Brazil, Beck, Cull, and 
Jerome (2003) for Nigeria, Haber and Kantor (2003) for Mexico, Omran (2003) for Egypt, and   7
bearing deposits. As issuers of demand deposits, commercial banks receive part of the 
inflation tax. According to ANDIMA-IBGE (1997), the inflationary transfers to the 
banking system fell from an average of 3.4% of GDP in the 1990-93 period to 1.8% in 
1994, and to 0.03% in 1995. 
In the immediate aftermath of the stabilization plan, Brazilian banks tried to 
make up for the inflationary losses by increasing credit. Total loans of the financial 
system went up 43.7% after the first eight months of the stabilization plan. The rapid 
increase in the concession of loans was not followed by a careful consideration of the 
risk characteristics of those seeking credit. When the Central Bank dramatically 
increased the reserve requirements on deposits in the second half of 1994, coupled with 
the continuation of a policy of high interest rates, a credit retrenchment followed. Non-
performing loans started to accumulate fast. 
With the imminent insolvency of some big private banks
2 a bailout mechanism 
was put in place in November 1995
3. Under this program, the Central Bank was given 
the mandate to compel a fragile bank to: a) increase its capital, or b) to transfer its 
shareholder control, or c) to be merged or acquired by another bank. PROER made 
easier for stronger financial institutions to acquire weaker ones by allowing the 
acquiring financial institutions to record as a premium the difference between the 
acquisition value and the market value of the acquired institution. Non-performing loans 
were recognized as losses and, under certain conditions, the premium could be used as a 
tax credit. It also allowed forbearance in the form of a temporary waive of the Basle 
minimum capital requirement for the ailing participants. In order to reduce the moral 
hazard problems associated to bailout schemes, PROER set out that banks could only 
qualify for official help when the ownership control was agreed to be transferred to 
some other institution. Seven banking institutions were restructured under the PROER 
resources. 
                                                                                                                                               
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy (2003) for Pakistan. Megginson (2003) and Clarke et al. (2003) provide 
comprehensive surveys about bank privatization studies. 
2 In August 1995, Banco Economico, the eight largest in the country by net worth, fell under Central 
Bank intervention. In November 1995, the same fate hit Banco Nacional, the sixth largest in the country 
by net worth. 
3 Program of Incentives to the Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial System, 
PROER.   8
The PROER program only reached private banks. A similar program aiming at 
the state-owned banks was launched in August 1996, the PROES
4. The aim of this 
program was not only to reduce the participation of the Brazilian states (provinces) in 
the banking activity but also to address their chronic public debt problems
5. Debt 
restructuring packages were offered for those states who agreed to give one of the 
following destinations to their banks: a) to liquidate it; b) to privatize it; c) to transfer its 
control to the federal government for future privatization, or, d) to transform it in a 
development agency. Less favorable financial packages were also offered to those states 
that still wanted to keep their banks after bailing them out. 
When PROES was launched, there were 35 financial institutions under the 
control of the Brazilian states, including 23 commercial banks. With the exception of 
the states of Mato Grosso do Sul, Tocantins (which had no financial institutions under 
their control), Paraíba, and Distrito Federal, all the other state units joined PROES. 
Under PROES, ten financial institutions were/are being liquidated, six banks were 
privatized by the states, six banks were/are being privatized by the federal government, 
sixteen financial institutions were transformed into development agencies, and five 
banks were restructured and kept under the state control
6. 
PROES only reached the banks owned by the states. For the banks owned by the 
federal government, an official restructuring program was launched in June 2001, the 
PROEF
7. Under this program, many troubled assets were transferred to a newly created 
institution under the Finance Ministry control. Three federal government-owned banks 
(CEF, BNB, and Basa) also received capital injection
8. 
The whole set of measures put in place drastically changed the ownership 
composition of the banking sector in the country. Tables 1 to 5 document such changes 
along several dimensions. 
                                                 
4 Program of Incentives to the Reduction of the State-Level Public Sector in the Bank Activity. See also 
Baer and Nazmi (2000), and Ness Jr. (2000) for more details. 
5 The two problems were not unrelated: state-level banks were the main purchasers of the public bonds 
issued by their main shareholders, the states themselves. Werlang and Fraga Neto (1995) study the role of 
state-owned banks in the creation of public debt. Bevilaqua (2000) describes state debt developments 
from the mid-1980s onwards, with special emphasis on the 1997 state debt bailout. 
6 See Appendix 1 for a list of the liquidated and privatized banks. 
7 Program for the Strengthening of the Federal Financial Institutions. 
8 Banco do Brasil (BB), another federal government-owned bank, was capitalized by the Treasury back in 
1995.   9
 
TABLE 1 Number of Commercial Banks by Ownership 
           
  Private Foreign Foreign  State   
Year Domestic  Minority  Control  Owned  TOTAL 
1994  146  31 37 32  246 
1995  142  32 36 32  242 
1996  130  29 40 32  231 
1997  119  26 45 27  217 
1998  105  17 58 23  203 
1999 96 12 67 19  194 
2000 93 13 69 17  192 
2001 82 14 70 16  182 
2002 75 10 56 14  155 
 
The number of commercial banks operating in Brazil has been reducing since 
1994. There were 91 fewer banks working in the country in 2002 than in 1994. Apart 
from foreign controlled banks, all the other bank segments showed considerable 
reductions in their numbers. Even for foreign controlled banks, the year 2002 
represented a reversal of the trend when, after many years of continuing expansion, their 
number showed a reduction.   10
 
TABLE 2: Share of bank system net worth by ownership 
           
    Private Control  State   
 Year Domestic  Foreign  Owned   
 1993 48.47  7.32  44.21   
 1994 56.03  9.64  34.33   
 1995  49.93 13.27 36.80   
 1996  56.03 10.42 33.55   
 1997  52.64 14.51 32.85   
 1998  50.55 22.21 27.23   
 1999  47.55 25.93 26.53   
 2000  51.35 28.88 19.76   
 2001  52.19 31.35 16.45   
 2002  49.74 33.62 16.64   
 
TABLE 3: Share of bank system assets by ownership 
           
    Private Foreign  State   
 Year Domestic  Control  Owned   
 1993 40.72  8.36  50.92   
 1994 41.29  7.17  51.53   
 1995 39.25  8.41  52.34   
 1996 39.12  9.82  51.06   
 1997  36.90 12.87 50.24   
 1998  35.47 18.47 46.06   
 1999  33.33 23.34 43.33   
 2000  35.50 27.62 36.88   
 2001  37.55 30.13 32.32   
 2002  37.32 27.67 35.01   
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TABLE 4: Share of bank system deposits by ownership 
           
    Private Foreign  State   
 Year Domestic  Control Owned   
 1993 38.85  4.84  56.32   
 1994 39.41  4.59  56.00   
 1995 36.48  5.41  58.11   
 1996 34.18  4.37  61.45   
 1997 33.01  7.58  59.42   
 1998 33.28  15.23  51.49   
 1999 32.07  16.93  50.99   
 2000 34.28  21.36  44.36   
 2001 35.80  20.41  43.79   
 2002 37.16  20.13  42.71   
 
TABLE 5: Share of bank system loans by ownership 
           
    Private Foreign  State   
 Year Domestic  Control  Owned   
 1993 31.55  6.57  61.88   
 1994 35.47  5.20  59.34   
 1995 31.93  5.75  62.32   
 1996 32.91  8.70  58.39   
 1997  35.61 11.80 52.59   
 1998  31.26 15.02 53.72   
 1999  32.03 19.98 48.00   
 2000  34.96 25.48 39.56   
 2001  42.82 32.03 25.15   
 2002  40.45 30.48 29.07   
   12
Tables 2 to 5
9 show that private domestic banks managed to keep their share of 
the bank system net worth, assets, and deposits. This group of banks even increased 
their share of the bank system loans. 
Foreign controlled banks increased significantly their market penetration in the 
country. In 2002, they accounted for 33.6% of the bank system net worth, 27.7% of the 
bank system assets, 20.1% of the bank system deposits, and 30.5% of the bank system 
loans. 
Despite the great reduction in the importance of the state-owned banks, they still 
account for significant shares of the bank system net worth (16.6%), assets (35%), 
deposits (42.7%), and loans (29.1%). 
 
3. Methodology 
  Productivity is defined as any variation in output that cannot be explained by 
variations in inputs. On this account, productivity changes can be due either to 
variations in efficiency or to changes in technology. 
The methodology to be applied in this paper follows the approach developed by 
Olley and Pakes (1996). A panel data for Brazilian banks will be used with the aim of 
estimating the parameters of a production function. In usual fashion, productivity is 
measured as the residual from this relation. 
Olley and Pakes’ approach allows one to consistently estimate the production 
function coefficients taking into consideration two possible sources of bias, namely a 
sample selection and a simultaneity bias. 
The sample selection bias refers to the fact that many banks left the market 
during the sample period. It is reasonable to imagine that the unobservable productivity 
variable and the decision to leave the market are correlated, causing a potential sample 
selection problem. The simultaneity problem is related to the correlation between the 
unobservable productivity variable and the amount of inputs chosen by the bank. 
                                                 
9 In tables 2 to 5, the foreign minority group is incorporated into the private domestic group.   13
The authors deal with both problems by first modeling the optimal firm decision 
regarding both the use of inputs as well as the market exit/no exit. The solution to the 
firm control problem takes the form of an exit rule and an investment demand function, 
respectively given by: 
     
otherwise      








χ      (1) 
) , ( t t t t k i i ω =      ( 2 )  
where  t χ  is an indicator function equal to zero when the firm exits the market,  t ω  is 
the firm productivity index,  t k  is the firm capital stock, it is the firm investment level, 
and  (.) t ω  and  (.) t i  are functions that are determined as part of the Nash Markov 
perfect equilibrium of the firm optimization problem. 
The procedure to be adopted in the estimation can be illustrated taking the 
example of a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
it it it l it k it l k y η ω β β β + + + + = 0    (3) 
where yit is the log of the output of firm i in period t, kit is the log of its capital stock, lit 
is the log of its labor input,  it ω  is its productivity, and  it η  is an error stochastic term. 
Notice that both ω  and η  are not observed by the econometrician. The difference 
between them is that ω  is a state variable in the firm decision problem and therefore it 
affects both the exit decision as well as the demand for inputs, while η  has no such 
implications. 
  Olley and Pakes propose a three-step procedure to estimate the coefficients of 
(3) taking into consideration the sample selection and the simultaneity problems. In 
order to implement the first step, the inversion of (2), which is strictly increasing in ω , 
allows one to write: 
) , ( t t t t k i h = ω       ( 4 )    14
  Equation (4) expresses the unobserved productivity variable as a function of 
observable variables. By replacing (4) in (3) it is possible therefore to control for ω  in 
the estimation: 
it it it t it l it k i l y η φ β + + = ) , (       ( 5 )  
where: 
) k , i ( h k ) k , i ( it it t it k it it t + + ≡ β β φ 0      (6) 
  The “partially linear” model (5)-(6) is a semiparametric regression model. The 
first step in the estimation allows the identification of the variable input coefficient  l β , 
but it does not allow the identification of the fixed input coefficient  k β . That is, the 
estimation of (5)-(6) does not allow one to separate the effect of capital on output from 
the effect on the investment decision. 
  The second step involves the determination of the survival probability. After 
replacing (4) in (1), it is possible to express the survival probability as a function of 
observable variables only: 
[] t t t t t t t t P ) k , i ( P J ), k ( ≡ = = + + + 1 1 1 1 Prob ω χ     (7) 
where Jt is the information set available at t. Equation (7) can be alternatively estimated 
by probit/logit, where polynomial terms of it and kt are used as regressors, or by non 
parametric methods. 
  The third step in the estimation begins with the assumption that productivity 
follows a first-order Markov process: 
[] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + + + − = + = + = = t t k t t t t t t t t t t ) k , P ( g ) , ( g , E ξ β φ ξ ω ω ξ χ ω ω ω  (8) 
where  1 + t ξ  is the innovation in  1 + t ω . 
By making use of the previous results, it is possible to show that  1 1 + + − t l t l y β  
can be written in regression form as: 
1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + + − + = − t t t k t t t k t l t ) k , P ( g k l y η ξ β φ β β     (9)   15
  Since it is assumed that the capital stock in a given period is known at the 
beginning of the period, it then follows that  1 + t ξ  and kt+1 are independent variables, 
which makes possible the consistent estimation of  k β  in (9). However, since  1 + t ξ  and 
lt+1 are not independent variables, one can see the need for the first step estimation. 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) introduced an important improvement in the Olley 
and Pakes’ methodology by making use of an intermediate input instead of investment 
as a proxy variable for the productivity. Investment can only work as a valid proxy if it 
does not take zero values, which can be a very restrictive condition for the data sets 
typically found in developing countries. 
Levinsohn and Petrin also argue that the monotonicity condition required for the 
inversion of (2) may not be valid due to capital adjustment costs. The monotonicity 
condition for investment is then replaced by an equivalent requirement for the 
intermediate input function  ) , ( t t t t k ω τ τ = . Another requirement for the use of the 
intermediate input as a proxy for productivity is an assumption of competitive market. 
The indexation of the  (.) τ  function by t allows for temporal changes in prices although 
variation across firms is not allowed. 
The methodology advanced by Levinsohn and Petrin does not require 
separability of all intermediate inputs in the production function. It is required that only 
one intermediate input be separable such that its isolated contribution to output can be 
computed. The authors choose electricity as the productivity proxy on the account that 
all firms need such input. Moreover, in their sample, there was no firm producing or 
selling electricity, which can be interpreted as an impossibility for storing such input, 
making it highly correlated with contemporaneous productivity levels. 
The previous equations can then be adapted to the Levinsohn and Petrin 
extension: 
) , ( t t t t k e h = ω       ( 1 0 )  
it it it t it l it k e l y η ϕ β + + = ) , (       ( 1 1 )    16
where  it e  is electricity, and 
) k , e ( h k e ) k , e ( it it t it k it e it it t + + + ≡ β β β ϕ 0    (12) 
Under the assumption that productivity follows a first-order Markov process, 
one obtains: 
)] , ( [ ) ( ] [ 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − = = = it it t it it it t i k e h g g E ω ω ω ω     (13) 
Lagging (12) one period, replacing in (13), and replacing the result in (11), one 
obtains: 
[] it it it k it e it it t it k
it e it it it t it k it e it l it
k e ) k , e ( g k
e ) k , e ( h k e l y
η ξ β β β ϕ β
β β η β β β β
+ + − − − + +
+ + = + + + + = −
− − − − − 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0    (14) 
Expression (14) requires the knowledge of  1 − t ϕ , which can be estimated in the 
first-step. Equation (14) is then used to estimate  e β  and  k β  by non-linear least squares. 
In addition to the replacement of investment by an intermediate input as a proxy 
for productivity, Levinsohn and Petrin do not consider the estimation of the second step 
in the Olley and Pakes algorithm. In other terms, they do not account for the sample 
selection bias. Levinsohn and Petrin argue that the use of an unbalanced panel controls, 
to some extent, for such bias. Moreover, both Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn 




4. Data and sample 
The empirical section of the paper aims at estimating a Cobb-Douglas 
production function having a measure of bank output as the dependent variable and 
three productive inputs as explanatory variables. Appendix 2 gives more detailed 
information on data sources and variable definitions.   17
The inputs are labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. Following Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003), a separate intermediate input is used as a proxy variable for productivity. 
Unlike the manufacturing sector, however, the use of electricity as a proxy variable in 
the banking industry does not seem to be warranted. We therefore take communications 
as our proxy for the unobserved productivity. Capital stock is treated as a fixed input 
since adjustment costs may prevent instantaneous reallocations of such input. As for 
labor, we treat it alternatively as a variable and as a fixed factor.
10 
Measurement of bank output is more controversial, with many approaches being 
proposed in the literature
11. Here, output is measured as the value of total bank working 
assets, making our model consistent with the intermediation approach. Haynes and 
Thompson (1999) use a similar procedure. Some empirical studies use bank deposits 
either as output or as input of the bank activity. However, because of the relevance of 
bank deposits in the liability side of a bank balance sheet, the inclusion of them would 
cause a serious problem in the estimation of the production function, due to the 
accounting identity equating total assets and total liabilities. In the present study 
therefore bank deposits are not included in the bank production process.  
The source of the accounting data is COSIF (Accounting Plan of the National 
Financial System Institutions), elaborated by the Brazilian Central Bank, and by which 
all the financial institutions operating in the country have to report balance sheet and 
income statements on a monthly basis. The accounts for (end of) June and (end of) 
December of each year during the period from December 1990 to December 2002 were 
used. 
The sample is unbalanced with 242 commercial banks. All the observations with 
zero values for the output or for one of the inputs were excluded from the analysis. In 
addition, banks with less than three observations, and outliers were also excluded. The 
final sample contains 4,444 observations
12.  
                                                 
10 Labor economists in Brazil argue that, due to rigid labor market legislation, dismissal of labor force is 
very costly. Such friction can prevent instantaneous reallocations of the labor input making it behave as a 
fixed factor. 
11 See, among others, Berger and Humphrey (1992), and Fixler and Zieschang (1992). 
12 The criterion employed to eliminate the outliers was the following: initially, the ratios of output to 
labor, of output to capital, and of output to intermediate inputs were computed for all the valid 
observations. The observations in the lower 0.5% and in the upper 0.5% for each of the three ratios were 
excluded from the sample.   18
Table 6 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample variables for both the 
whole sample period, 1990-2002, and also for two sub-periods, 1990-1995, and 1996-
2002. The privatizations of the public-owned banks are concentrated in the second sub-
period. 
TABLE 6 - Sample summary
Variable Average Standard Deviation
Output*
1990 to 2002 (4444 obs.) 5,001 18,511
1990 to 1995 (1998 obs.) 3,629 15,135
1996 to 2002 (2446 obs.) 6,116 20,791
Employees
1990 to 2002 3,261 12,381
1990 to 1995 3,596 13,248
1996 to 2002  2,988 11,625
Capital*
1990 to 2002 123.9 648.2
1990 to 1995 141.0 789.6
1996 to 2002  110.0 504.7
Other intermediate inputs*
1990 to 2002 28.0 101.8
1990 to 1995 26.2 92.9
1996 to 2002  28.4 108.4
* in million of Reais (December 2002 values)  
The dispersion of the variables across banks is very large, with the standard 
errors being nearly four times larger than the mean values. There is no discernible 
difference between the two sub-periods in this regard. Firm bank heterogeneity is 
therefore very significant in the sample and for both sub-periods. 
Mean production increases between the two sub-periods, alongside concomitant 
reductions in the use of labor and capital. Intermediate inputs, by contrast, have 
increased between the two sub-periods. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the mean values of the variables across 
time.   19






































































































































capital intermediate inputs  
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One can then observe that bank output starts to continuously increase since 
1993, registering an accumulated growth of 122% between Jun 1993 and December 
2002. Employment reduces over the sample period with the largest fall occurring 
between 1990 and mid-1997. After 2000, employment has recovered a little. Capital 
stock shows a decreasing trend starting in 1993. Average capital stock halved its value 
between the peak of December 1992 and December 2002. Intermediate inputs are the 
only inputs that followed the increasing pattern for the output in the most recent years. 
 
 
5. Estimation of bank productivity 
This section implements Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology to obtain 
measures of productivity for a sample of Brazilian banks. In the next section, the bank-
level productivity measures so obtained are regressed on a number of control variables, 
including, among them, dummy variables representing privatization of state-owned 
banks. 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) modify Olley e Pakes (1996) approach in two 
ways. First, they replace investment by electricity as a proxy variable for productivity. 
Second, they do not model the exit decision by the bank. For the sample of Brazilian 
banks, troubled banks stop reporting employment levels to the Central Bank, which 
preclude us to implement the second step in Olley and Pakes algorithm. As Levinshohn 
and Petrin argue, we hope that the use of unbalanced panel data helps to reduce the 
sample selection bias. 
The first step of the algorithm involves the estimation of the following “partially 
linear” equation: 
it t it it t it k it c it i it l it time ) k , c ( h k c i l y ε β β β β β + + + + + + + = 0    (15) 
where  it y  is the log of bank output,  it l  is the log of labor,  it i  is the log of other 
intermediate inputs,  it c  is the log of communications,  it k  is the log of capital,  t time  is a 
trend variable, and  it ε  is the random error term.    21
The  ) k , c ( h it it t  function is estimated by means of a polynomial series expansion 
where terms of up to the fourth degree of  it c  and  it k  are used. This series expansion is 
separately estimated for three different sub-periods: from 1990 to June 1994, from 
December 1994 to 1997, and from 1998 to 2002. In equation (15) labor is considered as 
a variable factor. We also estimated models where labor is treated as a fixed factor. 
When this is the case, labor is also incorporated in the polynomial series expansion. 
The first step of the estimation allows one to obtain consistent estimates of the 
variable factor coefficients,  l β  and  i β . Once these coefficients are obtained, we 







it i l y y β β − − =        ( 1 6 )  
This term is then regressed on a polynomial series in  ) k , c ( it it . The fitted value 
from this regression is denoted  ) k , c ( ˆ it it t ϕ . 
In the second step, consistent estimates for  c β  and  k β  are obtained through 
non-linear least squares applied to: 
[] it it it k it c it it t it k it c
p
it k c ) k , c ( ˆ g k c y ε ξ β β β ϕ β β β + + − − − + + + = − − − − − 1 1 0 1 1 1 0  (17) 
where  it ξ  is the innovation term in productivity. 
Table 7 presents the production function coefficients estimated through the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (L-P) algorithm, alongside the coefficients obtained through least 
squares estimation.
13 
                                                 
13 The standard errors of the coefficients for the fixed inputs and for communications in the L-P models 
were obtained by bootstrap resampling 100 times. There are fewer observations in the L-P models due to 
the use of lagged terms in the estimation of (17).   22
TABLE 7 - Estimates of production function parameters 
Input Least Squares
L-P        
(variable labor)
L-P           
(fixed labor)
ln (labor) -0.0479* -0.1485*** 0.4409***
(-1.90) (-3.30) (4.17)
ln (other intermediate) 0.2599*** 0.2137*** 0.4391***
(9.03) (8.21) (19.74)
ln (communications) 0.6162*** 0.6119*** 0.2047***
(22.94) (8.68) (4.80)
ln (capital) 0.0236 0.0515* 0.064
(1.50) (1.89) (1.07)
time 0.0482*** 0.0379*** 0.0546***
(20.96) (6.06) (8.24)
Observations 4444 4202 4202
t-statistic in parentheses
*,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively  
The labor coefficient in the least squares estimation is negative, and marginally 
significant. When labor is treated as a variable factor in the L-P approach, its coefficient 
becomes even more negative and highly significant this time. The last column of Table 
7 shows the estimates of the L-P approach when labor is treated as a fixed factor. This 
model shows more reasonable values for the estimated coefficients, although the 
statistical significance of the capital stock coefficient is still low
14. Thus, for the 
remaining of the analysis, the coefficients shown in the third column are used as the 
estimates for the bank production function. 
As discussed in section 3, it is important that monotonicity with respect to 
productivity holds for the communications input. If this assumption is violated, we 
cannot invert this function to express productivity as a function of observable variables. 
In order to check the validity of this assumption, communications was regressed on 
productivity and on the fixed inputs (capital and labor). All the estimated coefficients 
are positive and significant. 
                                                 
14 The results are robust to different cutoff values for the outliers (0.5%, 1%, 2%), and also to different 
degrees for the polynomial expansion series (fourth and fifth degrees).   23
Bank-level (log of) total factor productivity is computed as the difference 
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Aggregate bank productivity is calculated as the weighted bank-level 
productivity for each period, where the weight is given by the market share of each bank 
product in each time period. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the aggregate productivity 
alongside a more standard measure of productivity, namely labor productivity 
(calculated as the weighted average of  it it l y − ), both normalized to one in June 1990. 
Figure 3: Brazilian banking system: total factor, and labor productivity 
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The two aggregate productivity measures display similar temporal patterns 
although their numerical scales differ. It is interesting to notice that labor productivity 
underestimates total factor productivity in banking, which is the opposite of what is 
found for the manufacturing sector in Brazil [Muendler (2002), Schor (2003)]. One 
possible reason for these differences is the large fall in the capital stock in banking   24
shown in Figure 3, whereas capital stock has increased in the manufacturing sectors 
over the 1990’s. 
Aggregate total factor productivity increases up to June 1997, remaining fairly 
flat after it. The accumulated productivity growth over the entire period is 13.48%, or an 
average annual growth rate of 1.02%. There is great heterogeneity across sub-periods 
though. In the period from June 1990 to June 1997, the average annual growth rate 
reached 3.70%. From June 1997 to December 2002, there is actually a small fall in the 
aggregate productivity: there is an accumulated fall of 3.63% or an average annual fall 
of 0.67%. 
Nakane (1999) found similar results through the estimation of cost functions for 
Brazilian banks accounting for efficiency according to the stochastic frontier 
methodology
15. According to his estimation, the average cost efficiency index for 
Brazilian banks reached 0.4151 in the June 1990 to June 1994 period, and increased to 
0.5098 in the June 1994 to June 1997 period. Bevilaqua and Loyo (1998) also document 
cost efficiency gains for a panel of 38 Brazilian banks during the last quarter of 1994 
and the second quarter of 1998. 
 
 
6. Determinants of bank productivity 
This section attempts to study the determinants of bank productivity. Special 
attention is paid to the role of the ownership structure. In face of an environment 
whereby different corporate changes are affecting the industry, Berger et al. (2003) 
argue that it is important to control for as many of the changes as possible. In other 
terms, even if the primary interest of the paper relies on the effects of bank 
privatization, the introduction of controls for corporate changes that do not involve 
state-owned banks (e.g. domestic M&As or foreign acquisition of domestic banks) are 
overdue. 
                                                 
15 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a survey of efficiency studies applied to banking.   25
Moreover, Berger et al. (2003) develop a framework where static, selection, and 
dynamic effects are contemplated. Static effects refer to the differences in performance 
for groups of banks that have not been involved in any corporate change. Selection 
effects are those related to the performance differentials for the groups of banks that 
were involved in some ownership change. Finally, dynamic effects capture the changes 
in performance for the last group of banks that are due to the change in ownership. This 
framework has been applied to study the Argentinean case by Berger et al. (2003), the 
Brazilian case by Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill (2003), and the Nigerian case by 
Beck, Cull, and Jerome (2003). 
The Brazilian case seems to be well suited for an application of this 
methodology. First, many corporate changes affected the banking industry in the 
1990’s, involving bank privatization, domestic M&As, foreign acquisition of domestic 
banks, and bank closures. Second, as documented in section 2, the process of bank 
privatization was very rich in Brazil. Public banks owned by states were offered 
different solutions to their banks, including, liquidation, outright privatization, 
federalization followed by privatization, and restructuring. 
Static dummy variables were created for those banks that did not face any 
ownership change over the sample period and were still active by the end of the sample 
period. Three static dummy variables were created for state-owned banks 
(dstatic_state), for foreign-controlled banks (dstatic_foreign), and for branches of 
foreign banks (dstatic_branchforeign). These dummy variables take the value one for 
the corresponding bank for all the time periods. Domestic private banks are the 
excluded reference group. 
Out of the 242 banks with observations in the sample, 112 (46.28%) of them 
were active by December 2002 without experiencing any corporate change. Five (2.07% 
of the total) of them were state-owned banks, 64 (26.45%) of them were domestic 
private banks, 32 (13.22%) of them were foreign controlled banks, and 11 (4.55%) of 
them were branches of foreign banks.  
The relevance of each group of banks cannot be entirely gauged by their 
respective numbers due to the presence of many small banks. We therefore computed 
the market share of each group in December 2002. On this account, the group of   26
commercial banks that have not experienced any corporate change responded for 
79.94% of the market share. The market shares accounted by state-owned banks, 
domestic private banks, foreign controlled banks, and branches of foreign banks are, 
respectively, 32.52%, 28.25%, 15.91%, and 3.26%. 
Selection dummy variables were created for those banks that have faced some 
corporate change over the sample period. Eight selection dummy variables were created 
for state-owned banks that were privatized and acquired by domestic banks 
(dselection_privatized_domestic), for state-owned banks that were privatized and 
acquired by foreign banks (dselection_privatized_foreign), for state-owned banks that 
were first federalized, later privatized and acquired by domestic banks 
(dselection_federalized_privatized_domestic), for state-owned banks that were first 
federalized, later privatized and acquired by foreign banks 
(dselection_federalized_privatized_foreign), for state-owned banks that were 
federalized and not privatized yet (dselection_federalized_notprivatized), for state-
owned banks that were restructured and kept under state ownership 
(dselection_restructured), for domestic banks acquired by other domestic banks 
(dselection_domestic), and for domestic banks acquired by foreign banks 
(dselection_foreign). The selection dummy variables take the value one for the 
corresponding banks during all the time periods. Notice that the selection variables 
control not only for different solutions given to the state-owned banks but also to the 
ownership of the acquiring bank.
16 
Out of the 242 commercial banks in the sample, 55 (22.73%) of them have had 
some form of control change. State-owned banks account for 19 (7.85% of the total) of 
the cases with 5 privatized banks bought by domestic banks, 2 privatized banks bought 
by foreign banks, 2 federalized and privatized banks bought by domestic banks, 1 
federalized and privatized bank bought by a foreign bank, 4 federalized and not yet 
privatized banks, and 5 reestructured state-owned banks. Of the remaining 36 cases 
(14.88% of the total) involving private banks, half of them are cases of domestic banks 
merging with other domestic banks whereas the other half are situations where domestic 
banks are being acquired by foreign ones. In terms of market share, the group of banks 
that were involved in any form of corporate change accounted for 20.06% of the market   27
in December 2002. The market shares of the state-owned banks, of the domestic banks 
acquired by other domestic banks, and of the domestic banks acquired by foreign banks 
are, respectively, of 9.51%, 5.17%, and 5.37%. 
Dynamic dummy variables were created for those banks for which the selection 
dummies were equal to one to date the precise moment when the ownership change 
occurred. Ten dynamic dummy variables were created for state-owned banks that were 
privatized and acquired by domestic banks (ddynamic_privatized_domestic), for state-
owned banks that were privatized and acquired by foreign banks 
(ddynamic_privatized_foreign), for state-owned banks that were first federalized, later 
privatized and acquired by domestic banks dating the time of federalization 
(ddynamic_federalized_privatized_domestic_datefederalization), for state-owned banks 
that were first federalized, later privatized and acquired by domestic banks dating the 
time of privatization (ddynamic_federalized_privatized_domestic_dateprivatization), 
for state-owned banks that were first federalized, later privatized and acquired by 
foreign banks dating the time of federalization 
(ddynamic_federalized_privatized_foreign_datefederalization), for state-owned banks 
that were first federalized, later privatized and acquired by foreign banks dating the time 
of privatization (ddynamic_federalized_privatized_foreign_dateprivatization), for state-
owned banks that were federalized and not privatized yet dating the time of 
federalization (ddynamic_federalized_notprivatized), for state-owned banks that were 
restructured and kept under state ownership dating the time of restructuring 
(ddynamic_restructured), for domestic banks acquired by other domestic banks 
(ddynamic_domestic), and for domestic banks acquired by foreign banks 
(ddynamic_foreign). The dynamic dummy variables take the value one for the 
corresponding banks for all the time periods following a certain intervention. 
The dynamic dummy variables capture the once-and-for-all changes associated 
to the interventions. However, in addition to this level effect, the interventions can have 
differentiated impacts over time. We therefore also created variables measuring the time 
lapsed since the intervention. Since we use 6-month observations in our sample, such 
variables are measured in semesters. Ten time variables were created, one for each 
dynamic dummy variable. The labels for such variables follow the same pattern as the 
                                                                                                                                               
16 For some few banks, there was more than one change of control. In such cases, we followed Berger et   28
ones defined for the dynamic dummy variables with time replacing ddynamic. For 
example,  time_federalized_privatized_foreign_datefederalization measures the time 
since a state-owned bank that was federalized, privatized and acquired by a foreign bank 
was federalized. Typically, the time variables take the value one in the semester when 
the intervention occurred, the value two in the following semester, and so on. 
We follow Berger et al. (2003) and actually exclude from the sample all 
observations for which the time variables equal one. In other terms, the semester during 
which the intervention occurred is not considered in the sample. The reason for this 
treatment is to try to control for noise introduced during the event of intervention, which 
usually produces some discontinuities in previous policies, involves legal costs 
associated to the intervention, etc. 
In addition to the static, selection, and dynamic variables we created another 
group of variables to deal with the banks that exited the market.
17 Typically, banks have 
left the market either because they were liquidated or because they changed their 
activities from commercial banking into something else. Accordingly, we defined five 
exit dummy variables for liquidated state-owned banks (dexit_liquidated_state), for 
liquidated private banks (dexit_liquidated_private), for commercial banks that became 
other banking institutions, e.g. investment bank (dexit_other_bank), for commercial 
banks that became other non-banking financial institutions, e.g. broker house 
(dexit_other_finance), and for commercial banks that became other non-financial 
institutions (dexit_nonfinance). The exit dummy variables take the value one for the 
corresponding banks during all the periods for which they are present in the sample. 
Out of the 242 commercial banks present in our unbalanced sample, 75 
(30.99%) of them have exited the market. Six (2.48% of the total) state-owned banks 
were liquidated, 23 (9.50%) private banks were liquidated, 12 (4.96%) commercial 
banks became investment banks, 8 (3.31%) commercial banks became non-banking 
financial institutions, and 26 (10.74%) commercial banks became non-financial 
institutions. Obviously, the market share of the exited banks is zero by December 2002. 
                                                                                                                                               
al. (2003)’s procedure and only consider the last change. 
17 Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill (2003) work with a balanced sample, excluding such banks from their 
analysis. We believe that keeping these banks in the sample is important to better deal with the sample 
selection problems discussed in section 3.   29
In addition to the above mentioned variables we also included two additional 
control variables given by the lagged market share (market_share), as measured by the 
share of each bank output in the sector output in each period, and lagged bank size 
given by the number of bank branches (branches). Time dummies were also included in 
the estimated regressions, with the aim of capturing macroeconomic effects not 
accounted for in the estimation. 
Table 8 presents the results when the “time” variables capturing the effects of 
corporate change over time are not included in the regression. Robust standard errors 
are computed throughout. The coefficients of the time dummies are not reported to 
spare space.   30
































*,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively
TABLE 8 - Determinants of Log(TFP)
 
The three static dummy variables are highly significant. The results show that 
state-owned banks are less productive than the private domestic ones (the reference 
group). On the other hand, both the foreign-controlled banks and the branches of foreign 
banks are more productive than the private domestic group. 
The five exit dummy variables are significant and one of them is positive. 
Liquidated banks have lower productivity than those commercial banks that left the 
market due to a transformation in their activities. State-owned liquidated banks have the   31
poorest performance within this group, followed by the private liquidated banks. 
Commercial banks that left the market and became non-financial institutions were 
actually more productive than the private domestic banks (reference group). One 
possible reason for some banks to leave the market is related to the increasing costs of 
staying in the bank business related to more stringent prudent regulations as well as to 
the introduction of the new payment system in the country during 2002. 
Five of the selection dummy variables are highly significant and negative. The 
remaining two selection variables are not significant with one of them having a positive 
sign. Overall, state-owned banks that underwent some corporate change are less 
productive than private banks that also faced some corporate change. The selection 
coefficients are non-significant for the latter group, indicating that their productivity is 
no different than the productivity of the reference group (domestic private banks). 
As for the state-owned banks, there is no clear discernible pattern for the 
selection variables regarding the type of solution given to them. In other terms, one 
cannot clearly state that state-owned banks that were privatized, or that were first 
federalized and later privatized, or that were federalized and not privatized, or that were 
restructured and kept under state control have better or worse performance compared to 
each other. It is also not possible to state any firm conclusion related to the ownership of 
the acquiring bank (i.e. private domestic or foreign control) in terms of the selection of 
state-owned banks. 
The static, exit and selection dummies plus the reference excluded group form a 
sample partition. One can therefore rank the groups according to the estimated 
coefficient for each dummy. Table 9 reports the ranking in increasing order (i.e. from 
the less to the more productive groups). The ordering is a weak one because some of the 
coefficients are not statistically different from each other. Equality coefficient tests are 
reported for pairs of adjacent variables and we indicate when the null is rejected.   32
Group F Statistics P-Value
1. Liquidated state-owned bank 1.03 0.3101
2. Privatized and acquired by foreign 0.64 0.4229
3. Federalized, privatized and acquired by domestic 0.06 0.8134
4. Federalized and not privatized 14.41*** 0.0001
5. Reestructured and kept under state control 2.68 0.1017
6. Privatized and acquired by domestic 0.06 0.8067
7. Federalized, privatized and acquired by foreign 0.87 0.3510
8. Active state-owned bank 15.70*** 0.0001
9. Liquidated private bank 2.91* 0.0883
10. Transformed into financial non-banking institution 0.81 0.3680
11. Transformed into other banking institution 0.88 0.3482
12. Domestic bank acquired by domestic 1.50 0.2210
13. Active domestic bank 0.07 0.7983
14. Domestic bank acquired by foreign 7.27*** 0.0071
15. Active foreign controlled bank 4.96** 0.0260
16. Active branch of foreign bank 0.76 0.3833
17. Transformed into non-financial institution
*,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively
F Statistics report a test of equality for the coefficient of the corresponding group and the
coefficient for the group in the row immediately below. All the tests have a F(1,4094) distribution.
TABLE 9 -   Ranking  of  groups  of  banks  according  to  static,  exit,   and  
selection  variables
 
One striking result from Table 9 is that all the groups involving state-owned 
banks occupy the lowest positions in the rankings. Even the still active state-owned 
banks have significantly lower productivity than liquidated private banks
18. Returning to 
the results of Table 8, only five out of the ten dynamic dummy variables are statistically 
significant. One of them has a negative coefficient, though, which is contrary to 
expectations. As a matter of fact, only five of the dynamic variables have the expected 
positive sign. Overall, the dynamic effects are not large in magnitude. 
As in Table 9, we can compute a weak ordering of the groups according to the 
estimated coefficients of the dynamic variables. Table 10 shows the results. We 
                                                 
18  Possible reasons for these results could be that such banks may be used as government agents, playing 
a "social" role. For example, Banco do Brasil and CEF are major players in the concession of loans to the 
rural and to the low-income housing sector, respectively, usually at subsidized rates. Nonetheless, such 
conjecture needs a careful analysis, examining and comparing lending policies from such banks with their 
counterparts.    33
consider the state-owned banks that were first federalized and later privatized during 
two moments: the period they remained under federal control, and the period following 
privatization. The variables we name …datefederalization and …dateprivatization in 
Table 8 aim at capturing the dynamic impacts of federalization and of privatization, 
respectively. Thus, Table 10 reports the rankings of ten distinct groups in increasing 
order.  
Group F Statistics P-Value
1. Reestructured and kept under state control 0.44 0.5073
2. Federalized, privatized and acquired by domestic, after privatization 0.00 0.9841
3. Federalized, privatized and acquired by foreign, during federalization 0.01 0.9372
4. Federalized and not privatized 0.02 0.8799
5. Federalized, privatized and acquired by domestic, during federalization 1.66 0.1983
6. Domestic bank acquired by foreign 0.02 0.8763
7. Federalized, privatized and acquired by foreign, after privatization 0.87 0.3512
8. Privatized and acquired by domestic 0.42 0.5182
9. Domestic bank acquired by domestic 1.33 0.2491
10. Privatized and acquired by foreign
*,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively
F Statistics report a test of equality for the coefficient of the corresponding group and the coefficient for the
group in the row immediately below. All the tests have a F(1,4094) distribution.
TABLE 10 - Ranking of groups of banks according to dynamic variables
 
The first five groups in Table 10 present negative impacts for the dynamic 
dummy variables. All of them involve state-owned banks. Three of such negative 
impacts are related to state-owned banks during periods of restructuring (either under 
federal or under state control). This result is not surprising because restructuring usually 
involves the transfer of troubled assets to the federal government. Since total assets are 
our measure of output, such banks may be facing a reduction in output while keeping 
unchanged their level of inputs and therefore reducing their productivity. 
When the performance of the state-owned banks is measured after the 
privatization, the dynamic impacts show a more positive outcome. Three of the four 
possible groups improved their performance after privatization. Moreover, the way a 
state-owned bank was privatized seems to matter with better performance related to 
straight privatization (as opposed to first federalize and then privatize).
19  
                                                 
19 The tests that the dynamic effects for state-owned banks that were privatized and for state-owned banks 
that were first federalized and then privatized are equal give F statistics of 8.38 (p-value equal to 0.0038)   34
Moreover, the ownership of the acquiring bank also seems to matter with better 
dynamic performance related to the privatized banks acquired by foreigners.
20 
Interestingly, when the corporate change involved only private banks, domestic banks 
seem to be associated with better dynamic performance than foreign ones, although the 
statistical significance for testing the difference between them is very low (F statistics 
equal to 1.64 with a p-value of 0.2010). 
The ordering shown in Table 10 can be misleading because any given value for a 
dynamic variable may have different quantitative implications for different bank groups. 
For example, a coefficient of, say, 0.2 for a dynamic variable may represent a 
tremendous improvement for a privatized state-owned bank and not such a great 
performance for a private bank. We therefore re-computed the rankings of the bank 
groups displayed in Table 9 by considering the dynamic effects of Table 10. In other 
terms we add the coefficients for each selection variable and the corresponding dynamic 
one, comparing the result with the static and exit variables. Table 11 shows the resulting 
weak ranking in increasing order. For the state-owned banks that were first federalized 
and later privatized we show their combined performance after the privatization, i.e. we 
take into account the impacts of the federalization period. 
                                                                                                                                               
when the acquiring bank is a foreign one and 3.52 (p-value equal to 0.0607) when the acquiring bank is a 
domestic one. 
20 The statistical significance for such tests are not very high though. The tests that the dynamic effects for 
privatized state-owned banks acquired by foreigners and for privatized state-owned banks acquired by 
domestic banks are equal give F statistics of 4.52 (p-value equal to 0.0336) when the state-owned bank 
was privatized by the state, and 2.09 (p-value equal to 0.1486) when the state-owned bank was first 




1. Liquidated state-owned bank 1 0.00
2. Federalized, privatized and acquired by domestic 3 0.51
3. Federalized and not privatized 4 8.48***
4. Reestructured and kept under state control 5 42.08***
5. Federalized, privatized and acquired by foreign 7 0.05
6. Privatized and acquired by foreign 2 0.00
7. Active state-owned bank 8 1.03
8. Privatized and acquired by domestic 6 6.29**
9. Liquidated private bank 9 2.91*
10. Transformed into financial non-banking institution 10 0.81
11. Transformed into other banking institution 11 4.34**
12. Active domestic bank 13 2.33
13. Domestic bank acquired by foreign 14 0.52
14. Active foreign controlled bank 15 0.29
15. Domestic bank acquired by domestic 12 0.10
16. Active branch of foreign bank 16 0.76
17. Transformed into non-financial institution 17
*,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively
F Statistics report a test of equality for the coefficient of the corresponding group and the
coefficient for the group in the row immediately below. All the tests have a F(1,4094) distribution.
TABLE 11 -   Ranking  of  groups  of  banks  according  to  static,  exit,  and  
selection  plus  dynamic  variables
 
It remains true that all the lowest positions are still occupied by former or active 
state-owned banks. Even the best performing in this group, the ones privatized and 
acquired by domestic banks, are still (significantly) lagging behind the worst performers 
in the group of private banks, namely the liquidated private banks. 
However, some noticeable improvements have been detected for the state-owned 
banks that were directly privatized. Privatized state-owned banks that were acquired by 
foreign banks jumped four positions in the ranking while the ones acquired by domestic 
banks improved two positions. The former group caught up with the active state-owned 
banks while the latter leapfrogged this group. 
The same good performance is not verified for those privatized state-owned 
banks that were first federalized. The two bank groups belonging to this category lost 
positions in the ranking. As already mentioned, such banks faced the negative costs of   36
restructuring, which impaired their productivity. In special, those federalized banks that 
were privatized and bought by domestic banks had such a poor performance that, even 
after the privatization, they perform no better than the liquidated state-owned banks. 
It is also worth mentioning that the alternative of restructuring the state-owned 
bank and keeping it under state control does not seem to yield good results. After taking 
into account the dynamic impacts, this group of banks lost one position in the ranking. 
On the plus side, restructured state-owned banks have significant greater productivity 
than those federalized state-owned banks that have not been privatized. 
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of the changes affecting the state-
owned banks. It shows the eight groups representing these banks during three 
hypothetical time periods. Time t shows the distribution previous to the corporate 
change, as represented by Table 9. Time t+1 shows the impact of the first corporate 
change, e.g. federalization for those banks that were federalized or privatization for 
those banks that were privatized straight away. Time t+2 shows the final configuration, 
as represented by Table 10. 
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Domestic banks that were sold to foreign banks leapfrogged the group of active 
domestic banks while domestic banks that were sold to other domestic banks 
significantly improved their performance increasing three positions in the ranking. 
Overall, the results suggest that dynamic effects associated both to straight 
privatization and to corporate control change in the private sector worked towards 
improving productivity of the involved banks. 
With regard to the other control variables included in the regression reported in 
Table 8, the results indicate a positive effect of lagged market share, and a negative 
effect of the lagged number of branches on bank productivity. Notice that the use of 
lagged market share helps to control for a possible reverse causality channel whereby 
more productive banks have an edge to increase their market shares. On the other hand, 
the negative effect for the number of bank branches may be pointing out to scale 
diseconomies. The operation of extensive branch networks can impart on productivity if 
the branches are small and geographically dispersed. 
The results reported so far assumed that the dynamic impacts of any corporate 
change have a “once-and-for-all” nature. A more realistic picture may be represented by 
a setting whereby the dynamic impacts materialize over time. Table 12 reports the 
results when the “time” variables capturing the effects over time of the corporate 
changes are also included in the regression.   38










































*,**,*** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively
TABLE 12 - Determinants of Log(TFP) with effects over time
 
As expected, there is little change in the coefficients for the static, exit, and 
selection dummy variables. There is also no change in the coefficients for market share   39
and number of branches. With respect to the dynamic dummy variables, only one of 
them remains significant but with a negative sign. Five (out of ten) “time” variables are 
positive with four of them being statistically significant. None of the negative “time” 
variables are statistically significant. 
More interestingly, all the four significant “time” variables are related to 
privatized banks. This finding gives support to the idea that productivity improvements 
after privatization may take some time to materialize. It is also worth mentioning that, 
unlike the previous findings, there is no clear dominance of one type of privatization 
over the other when the “over time” impacts are taken into account. There is also no 
clear dominance with regard to the ownership of the acquiring bank on the dynamic 
impacts of privatization. 
Figure 5 shows the results of a counterfactual experiment where the dynamic 
effects are allowed to vary over time. In time period one, the state-owned banks are 
ranked according to their static, exit, and selection coefficients displayed in Table 12. 
The ordering is exactly the same as shown in Table 9 and in Figure 4. We then 
computed the number of periods during which a typical bank for each group underwent 
some corporate change. The number of periods is just an average for the banks within 
each group. It turns out that the longest time span for which an intervention involving 
state-owned banks was observed in the sample was 10 semesters for those banks that 
were first federalized and later privatized and bought by foreign banks. Thus, period 
two in Figure 5 computes the impact effects of federalization for these banks. Such 
effects are given by the sum of the coefficients for selection, dynamic (date of 
federalization), and time (date of federalization) variables for this group of banks. In 
period three, the coefficient for this group of banks is given by the sum of the 
coefficients for selection, dynamic (date of federalization), and two times the time (date 
of federalization) variables. And so on. The procedure to compute the coefficients for 
the other groups of state-owned banks was the same. Hence, Figure 5 preserves the time 
lengths typically observed in our sample during which the corporate changes were put 
in effect.   40
Figure 6: State-owned banks: static, exit, selection, and dynamic  
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The results are similar to those depicted in Figure 4 but with richer dynamic 
responses. The positive “over time” dynamic impacts of privatization are visible for all 
four involved groups. This effect is particularly impressive for the directly privatized 
banks bought by foreigners. Those banks that were directly privatized and bought by 
domestic banks aimed at leapfrogging the active state-owned banks three periods (one 
and a half years) after being privatized. 
Figure 4 suggested a rather disappointing performance for the banks that were 
first federalized and later privatized to domestic banks. Even after privatization, their 
productivity was no better than the productivity of the liquidated state-owned banks. 
Figure 5 helps to explain what happened to such banks. The “over time” effects of 
federalization were negative to them and the “on impact” effect of privatization was 
strongly negative. The “over time” effects of privatization, however, are positive. 
Actually, this group of banks has the greatest coefficient on the “over time” effects, 
according to the estimates displayed in Table 12. It turns out that the privatization of 
these banks is of a more recent vintage. So, their apparent dismal performance is 
explained by the fact that the positive impacts of privatization have not taken their full   41
effect yet. Giving time to time, our estimates suggest that these banks are catching-up 
with the other groups. 
Summing up, our results suggest that state-owned banks are less productive than 
their private peers. Privatization of state-owned banks improves productivity. In special, 
the beneficial effects of privatization are spread out over many periods. In addition, 
restructuring the state-owned banks and keeping it under state control seems to be a 




In the 1990s, the Brazilian banking sector underwent huge transformations. 
Following the control of the inflationary process, there was an intense wave of mergers 
and acquisitions, involving not only domestic agents but also foreign banks. Many state-
owned banks were privatized; some of them were closed down. Many troubled private 
banks also went bust. Improved bank regulation and supervision were also put into 
action. The purpose of this study was to evaluate how bank productivity was affected by 
these changes. Particular attention was paid to the effects of the privatization of state-
owned banks. 
The empirical sections of the paper made use of an unbalanced panel data for 
242 commercial banks, observed twice a year, from December 1990 to December 2002. 
Bank-level productivity measures were obtained as the difference between actual and 
expected output, where the latter is the fitted value from the estimation of a production 
function. The estimated production function follows the strategy suggested by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to account for endogeneity problems. 
In the second stage of the investigation, we tried to evaluate the role of some 
control variables on the level of the bank productivity. Given the varied nature of 
corporate changes during the sample period, we follow Berger et al. (2003) and try to 
control for static, selection, and dynamic effects. We also include dummy variables 
controlling for exited banks. The results show a positive association between 
productivity and bank market share. It also shows negative effects from the number of   42
bank branches on productivity. Moreover, state-owned banks seem to be less productive 
than their private competitors. Bank privatization had positive “over time” impact on 
productivity. The way a state-owned bank is privatized seems to matter when the “over 
time” impacts of privatization are not computed. In this setting, straight privatization 
seems to be a superior strategy than federalization followed by privatization. However, 
when the impacts of privatization over time are taken into consideration, there is no 
clear dominance of one form of privatization over the other. There is also no clear 
dominance in the dynamic performance of privatized banks acquired by foreigners over 
those acquired by domestic banks and vice versa.   43
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Appendix 1: State-owned banks in Brazil 
State-owned banks in Brazil operate under two government level structures: at 
the federal, and at the state (province) level. There were 32 state-owned commercial 
banks operating in Brazil in December 1994, which were reduced to 16 by December 
2002. Eleven banks were privatized, four banks are currently under Central Bank 
intervention for future privatization, and ten commercial banks were/are being closed 
down. 
Table 13 shows the list of the privatized banks, which includes banks for the 
following Brazilian states: Amazonas (AM), Bahia (BA), Goiás (GO), Minas Gerais 
(MG), Paraíba (PB), Paraná (PR), Pernambuco (PE), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), and São Paulo 
(SP). In addition, a bank previously owned by the federal government (Banco 
Meridional) was also privatized.
21 
Banespa, BEA, and BEG are cases of state-owned banks that were federalized 
previous to privatization. The other banks displayed in Table 13 were directly 
privatized. 
The four commercial banks that are being prepared for the Central Bank for 
future privatization include the banks that were previously owned by the following 
states: Ceará (CE, BEC), Maranhão (MA, BEM), Piauí (PI, BEP), and Santa Catarina 
(SC, BESC).
22 
                                                 
21 Meridional was later sold to Santander in 2000. For reasons explained in section 6, this bank is 
therefore not included as a privatized state-owned bank. 
22 BEM was privatized and bought by Bradesco on February 10, 2004.   46
 
TABLE 13 - Privatized Banks 
     
Bank Privatization  Year  Buyer 
Banerj (RJ)  1997  Itaú 
Meridional (federal)  1997  Bozano Simonsen 
Bandepe (PE)  1998  ABN Amro 
Bemge (MG)  1998  Itaú 
Credireal (MG)  1998  Bradesco 
Baneb (BA)  1999  Bradesco 
Banespa (SP)  2000  Santander 
Banestado (PR)  2000  Itaú 
Paraiban (PB)  2001  ABN Amro 
BEA (AM)  2002  Bradesco 
BEG (GO)   2002  Itaú 
 
Banks that were previously owned by the following states were closed down: 
Acre (AC, Banacre), Alagoas (AL, Produban), Amapá (AP, Banap), Goiás (GO, 
Caixego), Mato Grosso (MT, Bemat), Minas Gerais (MG, Minascaixa), Rio de Janeiro 
(RJ, Bancoerj), Rio Grande do Norte (RN, Bandern), Roraima (RR, Baner), and 
Rondônia (RO, Beron). 
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Appendix 2: Data Related Issues 
A. Variables in the production function 
The dependent variable in the production function is the value of the bank 
working assets. Working assets is total assets less fixed assets. 
Capital stock includes premises, equipment, other fixed assets, and rented/leased 
premises and equipment. Capital stock is net of depreciation. Since capital stock is 
taken as a fixed factor in the production function, we lagged it one period in the 
estimation. 
Intermediate inputs are the sum of communications costs, water, electricity, and 
gas bill costs, maintenance costs, non-durable goods acquisition costs, data processing 
costs, and transport costs. The proxy variable for productivity is communications costs. 
The source for all the previous variables is COSIF, a monthly report on balance 
sheet and income statements accounts that all commercial banks in Brazil have to send 
to the Brazilian Central Bank. 
The number of employees is the only variable that does not come from COSIF. 
The source of this variable is still the Brazilian Central Bank (DEFIN/DINFO unit). 
Nominal values from December 1990 to June 1994 were first transformed into 
Reais, the new currency in effect from July 1994 onwards (1 Real = 2750 Cruzeiros). 
Constant values were obtained deflating the nominal values through the evolution of the 
IGP-DI, the general price index calculated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). All 
constant values were converted to December 2002 values. 
 
B. Explanatory variables in the productivity equation 
Market share is the ratio of a bank output to the total output in each time period. 
The Brazilian Central Bank (DEFIN/DINFO unit) provided the information on 
the number of bank branches.   48
The dummy variables for ownership control and transfer were formed from 
tables elaborated by the Brazilian Central Bank (DEORF unit) and available online. The 
only information not readily available was the restructuring date for the banks that kept 
their state ownership. Thorsten Beck kindly sent us this information, which was 
collected from different sources, including newspapers. 
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